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Given the controversy that has swirled around the interpretation of the
Timaeus from just about the time of its appearance, I make no apologies for
beginning any fresh attempt to assess its purported claims that the world is
an art-object with some brief remarks on my method of interpretation of the
dialogue as a whole.
First, my general source of interpretation will be hints that appear to
emerge from the text itself, rather than (though not to the exclusion of) a
broad range of commentary over the ages, ranging from the view that the
description of a supposed temporal beginning to the universe was elaborated
by Plato the way it was simply as a pedagogical device' to the view that the
dialogue does not set out to expound Plato's views at all.^ Xenocrates'
view—that any talk by Timaeus of the world as a supposed object of
creation is for pedagogical purposes only—has for some time now enjoyed
large-scale, though not universal acceptance, leading a significant number of
scholars to write off the Demiurge—the supposed fashioner of such a
world—as symbolic rather than real.^ I myself take it as a sound principle
of interpretation that Timaeus is to be understood literally except on those
occasions (such as 34b-c) when he explicitly indicates that he is not to be so
taken, on the simple grounds that it makes no sense on Plato's part to have
' The view is allribuled by ArisloUe lo Xenocrates {De Caelo 279b32-80al = Xenocrates fr.
54 Heinze), and may also have been held by Speusippus and left open as a possibility by
Theophrastus; for estimates of the evidence see A. E. Taylor, A Commentary on Plato's
Timaeus (Oxford 1928) 66-70; H. Chemiss, Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy I
(Baltimore 1944) 423 n. 356; G. Vlastos. "The Disorderly Motion in the Timaeus (1939)," in
Studies in Plato's Metaphysics, ed. by R. E. Allen (London 1965) 383 ff.; and L. Taran, "The
Creation Myth in Plato's Timaeus," in Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy, ed. by J. P. Anton
and G. L. Kustas (Albany, NY 1971) 404 nn. 140-43 (he adds Grantor to the list and possibly
Heraclides Ponticus).
^ The view espoused by Taylor (previous note).
^ For detaUs see T. M. Robinson, Plato's Psychology (Toronto 1970) 101 n. 20 and R. D.
Mohr, The Platonic Cosmology (Leiden 1985) 40. More recent adherents to the view include
E. Ostenfeld (below, note 13) and G. Carone, "Sobre el significado y el status del demiurgo del
Timeo," Methexis 3 (1990) 33-49.
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gone out of his way so to indicate had he intended the whole work to be
understood in some (unspecified) non-literal way. The resulting
interpretation of the dialogue in general and its apparent claim that the
world is a fashioned art-object in particular seem to me of at least as much
philosophical interest as a number of prevalent non-literal interpretations.
As part of such an interpretation 1 shall be attempting on this occasion to
show the following: 1) that for Timaeus—whom I understand to represent
Plato at the time of the dialogue's composition—the world is understood as
an object, not simply a concept; 2) that it is thought of as fashioned (or on
another, biological analogy conceived) at a point in time which is in fact the
beginning-point of time, in accord with a praeter-cosmic paradigm by a
praeter-cosmic artificer (or, on the other analogy, father); 3) that the
precosmic matter (or better, pre-matter) used for the formation of this world
as art-object is in eternal, unpredictable Heisenbergian motion, a motion
still residually present in the formed cosmos; 4) that the formed cosmos is
an art-object that is actually itself alive—a view current at the time and in
our own time resuscitated as the Gaia hypothesis; 5) that the same cosmos-
as-dynamic-art-object (as we may now describe it) is in epistemological
terms the object of at best justified true opinion, a state of consciousness
denied by Plato to be knowledge.
Turning to the dialogue, we can begin as Plato himself does with a
crucial metaphysical and epistemological distinction. "We must, then," he
says, "in my judgment, first make this distinction: What is that which is
always real and has no beginning of existence, and what is that which
comes into existence and is never real?" (27d5-28al). The translation of
the sentence is crucial. If at 27d6-28al the correct reading is xi to
yiyvoiievov ^ev dei ("what is that which is forever coming into
existence?"), we apparently have, "at the top of the show" so to speak, a
broad hint on Plato's part that his interest in the subsequent discussion will
be in an eternal world of Forms—those perfect paradigmatic particulars that
serve as the cornerstone of the metaphysics of so many of the dialogues,
including this one—and a co-eternal universe over and against them,
whatever the "temporal" drift of his own narrative. As it happens, however,
and as Whiitaker pointed out many years ago in a much-overlooked article,'*
del almost certainly did not appear in Plato's argument: He was instead
simply setting the stage for the discussion, in the immediately subsequent
lines, not of the ontological status of the eternal world of Forms and the
eternal world of genesis, but of the ontological status of any Form and any
sense-object and the implications thereof for that greatest of all sense-
objecLs (as he saw it), the universe itself.
* J. Whillaker. Phoenix 23 (1969) 181-85 and 27 (1973) 387-^8; cf. more recently J. DiUon.
A/P 110 (1989) 50-72.
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The point is reinforced immediately by Plato in the very next sentence,
where a sense-object is described as something that "comes into being and
goes out of being"; no manuscript carries a trace of any lost adverb azi.^
Which is not, of course, to suggest that in the Timaeus Plato has given up on
the Republic's doctrine that our world is a world of genesis2 (= "process"),
merely that in the present context what he is describing is simply genesisi
(= "beginning").
The stage for the argument is set in two rapid moves. First, with the
epistemological assertion, familiar to all readers of the Republic, that one of
the two objects—i.e., the Form—is "apprehensible by insight, along with a
rational account" (i.e., is in Plato's strictest sense "knowable"), the other
—
i.e., the sense-object—being "the object of opinion, in conjunction with
unreasoning sensation" (28al-4). Second, with the assertions a) that
anything that comes into existence must do so thanks to some causal agent;
b) that that agent uses a model to serve as his paradigm in the fashioning
process; c) that the only two types of model possible are ones described
respectively as "everlastingly and unchangingly real" (i.e.. Forms) and ones
that have "come into existence" (i.e., sense-objects); and d) that anything
produced in accordance with the former class of model will be on that very
account kalos ("an object of beauty"), anything in accordance with the latter
class not so (28a4-b2).
With this as his basis (none of it new to readers of the Republic) Plato
can now construct an argument concerning the universe. Having just
divided the real into everlasting objects and objects that have a beginning of
existence, he classifies the universe without further ado as belonging to the
latter class—i.e., as having had a beginning of existence—on the grounds
that "it can be seen and touched and has body, and all such things are
objects of sense" (28b2-8).
Satisfied on the above grounds that the universe can be reasonably
described as a sense-object and hence something that came into existence,
Plato then has no trouble positing a causal agent to account for its coming
into existence, an agent he calls its "craftsman and father,"^ a craftsman he
immediately admits it is hard to "discover" and impossible to "declare"
(= "satisfactorily describe"?) to every person (28b8-c5).
A few final moves complete the argument. Like any other causal agent,
the world's craftsman too must have used one of two available models, and
Plato declares that it must have been the one of an "everlasting" nature, on
the grounds a) that the universe is not only kalos but in fact "the most kalos
of things that have come into existence" and b) that its craftsman is the
^ For further instances in which what would have been an analogous dci is conspicuous by
its absence, see 28a 1, 37b2-3, 48e6-49al.
^ The terms are not ones that Timaeus confines rigidly to efficient causes. At 50c he will
compare Space to a mother, the eternal Fomi to a father, and the universe they form between
them to offspring.
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"best of causal agents"; the contrary supposition—i.e., that the Demiurge is
not agathos and the universe not kalos—is "something one cannot even
mention without blasphemy" (28c5-29a6).
The Demiurge's first actions are described by Plato as follows (tr.
Comford, with some changes):
1. "Since he wished all things to be good {agatha)^ and. as far as possible,
no thing to be imperfect, the god took all that was visible^—^not at rest but
moving in discordant and unordered fashion—and made efforts to reduce
it' from disorder to order, considering the latter to be in all ways better
than the former."
2. "Now it neither was nor is acceptable that he who is the most good
should bring about anything other than <what is itself> the most kalos}^
Weighing the matter, then, he kept finding that, among things by nature
visible, no product devoid of intelligence will ever be more kalos than one
possessing intelligence, when each is taken as a whole, and what is more
that intelligence cannot possibly come to be present in anything without
<the prior presence of> soul.*' In view of this reasoning, he who put
together the universe made efforts, in doing so, to fashion intelligence
within soul and soul within body, so as to prove to have fashioned a
product as kalos and as excellent as it could by nature be. This ... is how
we must say, according to the likely account, that this world came into
existence, by the god's providence, in very truth a living creature with soul
and reason."
As Comford points out (34), "the dialogue yields no more information
about the Demiurge" than is conveyed by the above short account. We
should therefore pause a while at this juncture and make a preliminary
assessment of what we at any rate appear to have been told. It can be
described in summary form as follows:
1. The world, like any of its constituent parts or contents, is a sense-object,
since it is sceable, touchable and possesses bulk, and is hence contingent
for its existence upon a causal agent other than itself.
2. Like all sense-objects, it had a beginning of existence and a maker/
father.
3. The model to which this maker/father looked is an eternal one,
guaranteeing that the world itself will be good; and the indisputable
' The word will again come as no surprise to readers of the Republic, though il raises
immediaie questions as to the role, if any, played by the Form of the Good in the scheme of the
Timaeus, and its possible relationship to the Demiurge and his activities.
* The tense is significant. Comford characteristically translates "is visible" (my italics), in
line with his understanding of Plato's intentions.
^ The tense is not aorisl, but imperfect, underlining the difficulties faced by the Demiurge in
his task.
'° The reference (immediately above) to all things being desired by the Demiurge to be good
{agathos) suggests that by kalos Plato means something nearer to that notion than to that of
simple physical beauty, so I leave it in transliteration.
^' Literally, "apart from soul."
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goodness of the world itself is an argument for the eternal nature of its
model.
4. The Demiurge is not only good but the "best of causal agents," and the
world he fashioned not only good but the "best of things (worlds?) that
have come into existence."
5. Over and against the Demiurge, apparently ab aeterno, are not just the
Forms but moving, unordered matter of some sort, which at a certain point
the Demiurge made successful efforts to reduce to some type of order,
producing the cosmos we know.
6. On the principle that no product that does not possess intelligence is
ever better than one that does, and that the exercise of intelligence is
contingent upon the <prior> existence of soul, he made the world a living,
intelligent creature, possessed of soul, intellect and body.
Taking these points in turn:
1. As Taylor (69-70), picking up on a point emphasized in Kant's
Critique ofPure Reason, indicated long ago, Timaeus' argument is gravely
weakened by the assumption that the world is a sense-object in the way,
apparently, that its parts or contents are sense-objects. One can go further,
in fact, and wonder whether any argument of the sort could be valid if it
assumes that the world is any type of "object" at all, rather than a general
concept indicating the finite or infinite sum of what exists/is the case. As so
often, Plato's realism assumes the referential nature of general terms and
goes off in vain search of the putative referent.
2. Given the basic philosophical weakness of the notion of the world as
sense-object, Plato's further contention that it is, like all sense-objects,
contingent—and apparently temporally contingent^ ^—upon a causal agent
other than itself is a fortiori shaky. But it has the great value, in
interpretational terms, of indicating clearly to the reader that reductionist
attempts to equate the Demiurge with the world, or with the world's soul, or
with the world's intellect, could never have met with his approval. ^^ If the
world, its soul and its intellect are all understood as contingent, as they are
indeed apparently understood, they will always, according to Platonic
doctrine, be dependent on some prior principle to account for their
existence, whether the Demiurge is explained away or not, and whether the
world is eternal or not. If this is the case, reductionists must find a reductee
that is, as a minimum requirement, unequivocally understood as non-
•^ Throughout this paper I shall be using the terms "contingent" and "non -contingent" in
their lime-honoured cosmological rather their current logical sense. I shall also be using them
in their weaker rather than in their stronger sense, i.e., to express a relationship of dependency,
but without invocation of a supposedly necessary being as explanation of a chain of exislents.
The basic data of the real as described by Timaeus—the Demiurge, Forms and Space—are just
that, apparently, data; no further claims in terms of their supposedly absolute—as distinct from
hypothetical—necessity are proffered.
^^ See above, note 3. E. Ostenfeld, Forms, Matter and Minds: Three Strands In Plato's
Metaphysics (The Hague 1982) 246, suggests that the Demiurge is to be equated with the
Circle of the Same in the world's soul.
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contingent. The only such candidate that has been brought forward, to my
knowledge, is the everlastingly self-activating soul described in the
Phaedrus and Laws 10. This point will be discussed later.
3. The model—the Eternal Living Creature—used by the Demiurge in
forming the universe is a clearly recognisable Form, though one
unmcntioned in previous dialogues, where its relevance would not in any
case have been clear. And like all Platonic Forms (excepting the Form of
the Good) its role and status are purely paradigmatic. It is also eternal, as
the Demiurge is presumably eternal, and neither one is described as
contingent for existence upon the other. So further reductionist attempts to
equate the Demiurge with this (or any other) Form, except perhaps the Form
of the Good—on which later—can have little chance of catching Plato's
intentions.
The analogue of Plato's vision is rather, as so often, to be found in the
Republic, where the philosopher-ruler sets out to form a good society on the
pattern of the Form of the Good. But it is not an exact analogue, since the
Form of the Good is there credited with what appear to be powers of
efficient, not simply paradigmatic causality, and to that degree the
philosopher can indeed be said to be contingent—if only at several
removes—for existence upon a Form. On the other hand, in the same
dialogue the Demiurge too is credited with efficient causality, leaving Plato
with a problem that could only be solved by a ruthless exercise of Ockham's
razor. That exercise is, it seems, performed in the Timaeus, where the
Demiurge is left as the sole efficient cause of the world's formation, and the
Form of the Good, if it is to be found at all, is reduced to the paradigmatic
status of all other Forms.
What of Plato's argument concerning the world and its paradigm?
There are, it seems to me, two major problems with it:
a) It is unclear why the everlastingly unchanging status of the Form
"Eternal Living Creature" should guarantee the world's goodness rather
than its status as a (contingent) living creature. What is more, Timaeus has
also apparently opted to endow the Demiurge with the twin attributes of
efficient and paradigmatic causality previously enjoyed by the Form of the
Good ("he wanted everything to come into being <with attributes> as close
as possible to <lhose possessed by> himself).
Matters arc complicated further by the apparent continuance in
existence, in the Timaeus, of the Form of the Good, at least as a standard
(paradigmatic) Form, and at the level of what now seems a mere cosmic
whisper. In a much-overlooked phrase at 46c7-dl Timaeus says, "Now all
these things are among the accessory causes which the god uses as
subservient in bringing to completion (anoxeXSiv), as far as possible, the
form of the best." For no good reason that I can see Taylor, followed by
Cornford ("in achieving the best result that is possible"), discounts the clear
possibility, seen by Archer-Hind, that we have here an echo of the notion of
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the Form of the Good, but now playing the role of paradigm rather than
efficient cause.''*
b) Statements at 28a and 29a suggest that Timaeus has either caught
himself in the coils of a circular argument or perhaps unwittingly affirmed
the consequent. At 28a the (hypothetical) argument runs:
If a craftsman looks to an everlastingly unchanging model, the product
will be one that is kalos; if to one that has come into existence, it will not
be so.
So Structured, the argument, had Timaeus completed it, would—to be a
valid (though not necessarily sound) one—have concluded as follows:
The model the Demiurge uses is in fact everlastingly unchanging.
Therefore the world he produces is kalos.
In fact we have to wait till 29a for Timaeus to return to the matter, but this
time he argues from the self-evident kallos of the world and goodness of its
Demiurge (contrary thoughts being deemed blasphemy) to the everlasting
nature of the model! Sj)elled out, the argument runs as follows:
If the world is kalos and its Demiurge agathos, the model used will be
everlasting; if the world is aischros and its Demiurge kakos, it will not
be so. Hi
The world is kalos and its Demiurge agathos.
Therefore the model is everlasting.
But this of course will not do. The argument at 28a was never
completed, and the second antecedent of the argument at 29a is based not on
argument or observation but the fear of being caught in blasphemy. Even
were \hQ, first antecedent soundly based, however, the consequent (i.e., that
the model used will be everlasting) would still be far from obvious, unless
the reader were already convinced of the validity of the previous argument
begun but not finished at 28a. But this argument never affirmed, let alone
attempted to prove, the critical antecedent that the world's model is
everlasting. So the reader is left with the uncomfortable choice of accusing
Timaeus of planning (but not completing) the argument of 28a along the
lines suggested above—and hence of being caught in an egregious piece of
circular reasoning, arguing first from the everlastingness of the model to the
kallos of the world and then from the kallos of the world to the
^^ A minor problem aliaching to this scenario is the fact that, were it the case, Plato would
appear to finish up with three paradigms for the world's goodness, the Form of ihe Good, the
Elemal Living Creature and the Demiurge himself. To which Plato might have replied, had the
question been put, that the significant quality of the Demiurge, in the mailer of world-making,
is his causally efficient status; whether the goodness of the world that was made had as its
paradigm the goodness exemplified by the Form of the Good or by the Form "Eternal Living
Creature" or by the Demiurge or by all three is of lesser moment.
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everlastingness of the model—or of planning to complete the argument
(fallaciously, unfortunately) as follows:
The world produced by the Demiurge is in fact kalos.
Therefore tfie model is everlastingly unchanging,
and so perhaps avoiding the charge of circular reasoning in the combined
arguments, but committing the fallacy of affirming the consequent instead.
All this, of course, has to do with the validity of Timaeus' arguments,
not their soundness. Even were the former granted, argumenti causa, the
notion that the world is self-evidently (to non-blasphemous people) kalos
would remain something of an unclear philosophical foundation.
4. In view of the problems raised by the above, Timaeus faces, it seems,
even bigger hurdles with his further claim that "the world is the most kalos
of things that have come into existence" and the Demiurge "the best of
causal agents." The latter claim could of course simply be true by
definition, the Demiurge playing the part of first and best among the gods in
the way Zeus is first and best among the Olympians. And the former claim
could have been based on the assumption that the totality of kala is quite
clearly more kalos than any of its constituents. But the sceptic would still
press Timaeus to explain a) why and in what precise sense the world is
kalos rather than aischros (and the Demiurge by the same token agathos
rather than aischros) and b) why the notion of the world as a sense-object
on an ontological and epistemological par with its own constituents is not
the untenable outcome of a fallacy of composition.
5. Over and against the Demiurge lies a realm described by Tiniaeus as
"all that was visible—not at rest but moving in discordant and unordered
fashion." This is presented as a cosmological datum, like the Demiurge and
the Forms, and is like them presumably to be understood as non-contingent;
every other item in the cosmology is described in terms of contingency.
Since there were no physical spectators of this supposed pre-cosmos, the
word "visible" is perhaps surprising, but ultimately of little import; as early
as the Phaedo (79a6 ff.) Plato was apparently using the word as a synonym
for "physical." We shall return to the whole question of the role and status
of the pre-cosmos and its components in Timaeus' scheme of things.
Suffice it for the moment to notice in passing that at this introductory stage
the stuff (for want of a better word) of which the cosmos will eventually be
formed is described as being—and as presumably always having been—in
chaotic motion; and there is no hint of any alteram quid that might be
understood as the initial or ongoing source of that motion. Nor is any
reason offered at this stage why Demiurgic intervention to reduce chaos to
some sort of order took place at one moment rather than another.
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6. As a paradigm himself apparently possessed of soul and reason^^ the
Demiurge naturally imparts the same qualities to his ordered universe,
though Timaeus as it happens offers as the reason the (far from obvious)
supposition that no thing not possessed of reason can ever be better (and the
best possible product is of course the Demiurge's objective) than one that is;
and taking it as self-evident that only living things can reason, he sees the
presence of soul, the life-principle, as an indispensable condition for the
operation of reason, and in that sense logically if not temporally prior to it.
These claims are worth careful study in themselves; for the moment we can
simply note that both soul and reason are described here in terms clearly
suggesting contingency, being as they are direct objects of Demiurgic
production. The same, it might be added, must be said of the planetary,
solar and lunar gods and the goddess Earth; all are unequivocally described
as being direct Demiurgic productions.^^
A central argument in favour of a non-literal interpretation of the
dialogue's creation account, including the role and status of the supposed
Demiurge, is the claim that, despite the apparent contingency of the world's
'^ A notion rightly defended by Vlaslos, "Creation in the Timaeus: Is it a Fiction?" in
Studies in Plato's Metaphysics, ed. by R. E. Allen (London 1965) 407, following Chemiss
(above, note 1) Appendix XI. For a reslalement of the Chemiss position see Tarfn (above,
note 1) 395 n. 34. Hackfonh, by contrast ("Plato's Theism," CQ 30 [1936] 4-9 = Allen,
Studies 439^7), followed by Mohr (above, note 3) 178-83. has argued that the most that can
be asserted is that the Demiurge is nous, not ensouled nous. But this is hard to square with the
statement at 29e3 that the Demiurge "desired that all things should come as near as possible to
being like himself." While in this precise context Plato has nothing further to say about the
impUcalions of anything' s being characterised by desire, when he returns to the topic in Laws
10 (897al-3) he makes it clear that it is still in fact for him one of a number of features that
characterise psyche as such, as he had indicated in detail for aU three \i.tpr\ of soul in the
Republic. The same can be said of the pleasure (cf. Laws 897a2) fell by the Demiurge in the
world of his formation (Tim. 37c7). It is only when there is talk of soul's "conducting all
things to a right and happy conclusion" (or the opposite) that she is characterised as vov>v
npoalxx^ovaa or dvoia o-uYYEvofievri {Laws 897b2-4); pleasure and desire are two of several
features apparently characteristic of soul tout court, without reference to the quality of what
soul might "bring about" (dncpYa^crai 897b4).
*^ Despite this description, it has been suggested by Comford (280) that the ease with which
in the final part of the dialogue (69a ff.) Timaeus blurs the distinction between the Demiurge
and the gods of his formation is further evidence of the mythical character of the formative
powers attributed to both. A less drastic and surely more likely explanation is that Timaeus, on
the assumption that the said gods, ever heedful of and obedient to their father's commands
(42e6-7), were at all limes implementing the wishes of the Demiurge, fell free to talk
indifferently of their or ihe Demiurge's activity, the crucial conceptual and real difference
between them having been made with clarity earlier on. In the same way Timaeus, when the
spirit moves him, will use a vivid present tense in the midst of a standard set of descriptive
aorists (e.g., at 37d6 noiei, e3 jirixavaxai); or will indeed on one occasion (53c-66d) dispense
with all talk of divine construction when faced with the task of covering a large mass of
complex terrain in a manageable amount of space and where a constant advcrsion to detailed
activity on the part of the gods would probably slow down the accomplishment of a more
imporunt objective—the detailed description of such things as the actual figures of the primary
bodies, the nature of motion and rest, and the like.
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soul upon Demiurgic production, there is one major statement in the
dialogue of the Phaedrus' doctrine that all soul is self-activating activity, or
self-moving motion.'^ To many this has suggested that Timaeus' real view
is that all soul is in fact /jo/i-contingent, whatever the apparent thrust of the
rest of his account, and that as a result the Demiurge is a superfluous entity,
all of his productive activities being easily ascribable to the world's soul, or
perhaps to its rational aspect.'* But this conclusion should, it seems to me,
be resisted, on a number of grounds:
1. It is far from obvious that the Phaedrus was written prior to the
Timaeus, as I have argued elsewhere. And if it was indeed written later, it is
methodologically risky to import its doctrine of soul into an interpretation of
the earlier dialogue, unless the Timaeus itself has a clear statement on the
matter.
2. As far as the latter point is concerned, the crucial evidence is found
at 37b5, where Timaeus talks of discourse being carried on "within the thing
that is self-moved." Cornford correctly'^ elucidates this as a reference to
"the Heaven as a whole," but then adds, "which, as a living creature, is
moved by its own self-moving soul." In some non-technical sense, this may
be thought to be self-evident; Plato, like Aristotle after him, thought that a
distinguishing feature of animals was that, unlike plants, they moved
themselves (see, e.g., Tim. 77c4-5). Such self-movement is however
merely contingent self-movement; one needs an explicit argument to show
that the soul which lies at the source of such movement is itself self-moving
in a manner that is won -contingent. And no such doctrine is found with
clarity in Plato's works before the Phaedrus.'^
As far as the present passage is concerned, nothing can be inferred from
the fact that Timaeus uses, to describe the world, the phrase "moved by
itself in a way not dissimilar to the use of a phrase to describe soul in the
Phaedrus, for he goes on to clarify himself immediately afterwards by
talking of the world as ''set in motion (kivtiGev) and alive"; the passive
voice is unequivocal, and sure evidence that the world's self-motion is in
Timaeus' view contingent. Nothing has been said, or even hinted at,
•''PWr. 245c ff., Vim. 37b5.
'* See above, note 3.
'9 For Chemiss. "The Sources of Evil According to Plaio." PAPS 98 (1954) 26 n. 24, the
reference is lo self-moving soul, and he ciles as evidence 37c3-5, especially ihe words aXko
nKr\v \|/wxriv. Bui this is far from clear. The passage would appear raiher lo be aboul the
universe, which has a soul (cf. ihe words auxo\) rnv nn^xriv 37b7), followed by a description of
a pair of prominent features of that soul (37c5-7).
^^ Chemiss (above, note 1) 428 has argued thai the following passages in the Timaeus
presuppose a doctrine of psychic self-motion: 37b5, 77c4-5 and 89al-5. Bui all of these
passages can be explained without difficulty as references to a contingent form of self-
movement; there is no hint of the presence, even at the level of assurriplion, of the more drastic
and all-embracing Phaedrus-doclrinc of non -contingent self-movement.
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concerning the soul of the world—whether it is itself self-moving and
whether, if so, its self-motion is of the contingent or non-contingent variety.
The fact is that all Timaeus needs for his argument to go through at this
point is a notion of soul as possibly self-moving—but if so merely in the
commonplace sense that animals are said to be self-moving—but in any
case merely contingently so,^* and this is of course exactly in line with his
earlier description of the world's soul as being of direct Demiurgic
construction. In a later dialogue Plato will come back to the question of
soul, and will attribute^^ to all (rational) souP-^ the quality of /ion-contingent
self-motion which in the Timaeus would appear to characterise merely the
soul of the Demiurge.
If this interpretation of the Timaeus stands up to scrutiny, we have I
think a cosmological schema of much greater modernity than has been
customarily ascribed to it:
1. Substitute the Big Bang theory for demiurgic intervention and we
have something very close to Plato's distinction between the eternal
duration of the pre-matter that eventually comes to form the world we know
and the (as he sees it) temporarily everlasting duration of such a formed
world. The similarity holds even with the oscillation version of the theory;
^' The phrase used by Comford (95 n. 2) lo describe soul
—
to eauxo lavovv—is of course
taken from the Phaedrus, and is nowhere to be found in the Timaeus, with or without the
world's soul as its ostensible referent. On the two single occasions when the world-soul's
motion is referred to in the dialogue, at 37a6-7 and 37c6, the voice is passive, not middle, as
Comford's own translations concede: "whenever [the world's soul] is in contact with anything
that has dispersed existence or with anything whose existence is indivisible, she is set in
motion all through herself . . ."; and "when the father who had begotten it saw it set in motion
and alive . . ." (my italics).
^^ The attribution seems lo be confined to one dialogue, the Phaedrus only, however.
Noticing perhaps a number of unacceptable implications for his other cosmological and
theological beliefs were he to make all (rational) soul non-contingent, Plato reverts to views
analogous to his earher ones in the Polilicus and Philebus and even (from the evidence of
967d4-7) the Laws, despite the claim, earlier in the same dialogue (896a 1-2; cf. 896a6-bl),
that soul is, as the Phaedrus had enunciated, "the movement which is able to move itself." For
details see Hackforth (above, note 15) 441-42 and Robinson (above, note 3) chapters 6, 8, 9
and 10.
^^ As Hermias saw, the argument at Phdr. 245c refers to rational soul only. It is also
significant that it refers to the totality of such rational soul, whereas the Timaeus does no such
thing; the soiJ possessed by the Demiurge cannot be argued, as it is argued by Taran (above,
note 1) 394 n. 30, to possess of necessity the same constituents as the world's soul and hence to
be clearly one and the same as it. (The argument is based on an assumption that the Platonic
doctrine of soul is a uniform one, but this is of course the very question in dispute.) The whole
point of the description of the world's soul is to demonstrate its contingent self-motion and its
"intermediate" metaphysical and epistemological status; the Demiurge, by contrast, is a non-
contingent datum of the real, and no more "intermediate" than those other non-contingent data,
Space and the Forms. What Timaeus would have said about the composition of his psyche we
do not know, but it seems hard to doubt that, had he wished to spell out the details of the
activity of that psyche, he would have described it in tenms that we would recognise as clearly
non-contingent self-movement.
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everlastingness is easily tailored to denote time-measured duration to the
end of a given oscillation.
2. The stuff composing the real is in beginningless motion, its basic
components, dubbed by Timaeus the "U^aces" of what will eventually come
to be the four elements earth, air, fire and water, being subject as a whole to
the laws of centrifugal and centripetal force but the path of movement of
any particular quantum of it being forever beyond prediction. It comes
therefore as no surprise to find that Heisenberg read the Timaeus in detail
during his school-years; for all his criticisms of many parts of it one cannot
fail to notice what he has also
—
perhaps unconsciously—taken from it.
3. The notion of the world-as-alive is once again currently fashionable
as the Gaia hypothesis. And now as then the notion is subject to the
criticism that it commits a compositional fallacy. From the proposition "A
is full of living things" one can no more infer "A is itself a living thing"
than from the proposition "This book is full of errors" can one infer "This
book is itself an error."
4. That the world of sense is the object of at best justified true belief is a
commonplace of contemporary epistemological thinking as well as a view
propounded in detail by Plato and never in fact abandoned by him. As an
insight it retains its force despite Plato's own invention of a second universe
to solve a problem that he thought his theory generated.
5. That the world is not just alive but a living art-object is a notion very
much around at the level of popular if not scientific belief. Plato's version
of the theory is peculiar in that, as a believer in a mimetic theory of art, he
needs a paradigm as well as an artificer to account for this as for any other
art-object, and the paradigm he chooses (what he calls the Form "Eternal
Living Creature") is, like the rest of the Forms, in the final analysis itself
more problematic than the original problem it purports to solve. The theory
does not, as it happens, need a mimetic theory of art to support it, as Plato
himself seems to have seen in the Laws, and is often put forward as an
appendage to one or another version of the cosmological argument. But it
remains fatally Hawed by circularity, in whatever version, Platonic or
contemporary.
What all this means in effect is that there is a good deal more Platonism
around, at the level of both popular belief and contemporary
epistemological and scientific theory, than is commonly supposed. This
was probably realized with more clarity in the past, when the contents of the
Timaeus in particular were more widely known and when the
Xenocratean—read "figurative"—interpretation of that dialogue had not
robbed it of most of its more interesting cosmological claims. A more
straightforward interpretation allows us to see with greater clarity the
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Platonic origin of some of our best and worst ideas on the universe and how
we perceive it, and to react in any way deemed appropriate to the
enlightenment.
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